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| Parcell, Joseph L.; Westhoff, Patrick C.. |
| This study summarizes research on farm-, local-, regional-, and macro-level economic effects of ethanol production. Given current production levels, the ethanol production industry annually employees approximately 3,500 workers, pays out nearly $132 million in worker salaries, generates over $110 million in local taxes, and takes in some $2 billion in government incentive payments. Projections for a 60 million gallon per year ethanol plant indicate an annual increase in corn usage of 21 million bushels, a one-time capitalization of $75 million, an increase in local corn prices between $0.06/bushel and $0.12/bushel, a 54 direct and 210 indirect jobs created, and increase in local tax revenues of $1.2 million, a decrease in federal commodity program... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Biofuel; Ethanol; Local economy; Government subsidies; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; O13; Q40; Q42; R10. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43774 |
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| Taylor, Richard D.; Mattson, Jeremy W.; Andino, Jose; Koo, Won W.. |
| This report evaluates the U.S. corn sector, especially changes in ethanol production. This analysis is based on a series of assumptions about general economic conditions, agricultural polices, weather conditions, and technological change. Changes in ethanol production will impact the production, feed use, and exports of corn, as well as the general price level. Federally mandated ethanol usage dictates the growth of ethanol production in the United States. Other factors have limited impact on corn price. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Ethanol; Government subsidies; Feed use; Corn; Exports; Crop Production/Industries; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23512 |
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| Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander. |
| This paper reviews the Latin American experience with highway privatization during the last decade. Based on evidence from Argentina, Colombia and Chile, we find that private financing of new highways freed up fewer public resources than expected because public funds were often diverted to bail out franchise holders. Furthermore, many of the standard benefits of privatization did not materialize because of pervasive contract renegotiations. We argue that the disappointing performance of highway privatization in Latin America was due to two fundamental design flaws. First, countries followed a privatize now, regulate later approach. Second, most concessions were awarded as a fixed-term franchise, thereby creating a demand for guarantees and contract... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Build-operate-and-transfer (BOT); Concessions; Cost-of-funds; Flexibility; Franchising; Government subsidies; Present-value-of-revenue (PVR); Regulation; Renegotiation; Public Economics; H21; L51; L91. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28456 |
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| Olson, Kent D.; Vu, Linh. |
| Changes and trends in farm productivity have been of intense interest to many involved with agriculture. This study used data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the output-oriented Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index from panel data for 1993-2006 for farms in Southern Minnesota. Bootstrap methods were used to estimate confidence intervals for the productivity, efficiency change and technical change indices. The model included three inputs (labor, land and immediate expenditures) and six outputs (corn, soybean, milk, hog, beef, and nonfarm income). Productivity growth was found to be positive during the period, with an average annual productivity growth of 6.6 percent. However, TFP growth has been slowing down in recent years and indeed... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Total factor productivity; Farms; Malmquist index; Data envelopment analysis; DEA; Bootstrap; Government subsidies; Farm Management; Productivity Analysis; Q12; C14. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49204 |
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| Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry. |
| We study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially, first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and then choosing a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a "labour-management conspiracy". |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Unemployment; Government subsidies; Wage bargaining; Labor and Human Capital; J58; J68. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25040 |
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